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FEDERAL FUNDING FOR THE PRESERVATION OF RELIGIOUS HISTORIC PLACES: 
OLD NORTH CHURCH AND THE NEW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 
Christen Sproule 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . .” 
-- The First Amendment of the United States Constitution1 
 
“What would many neighborhoods be like if there were only rubble-strewn empty lots 
or another batch of fluorescent-lighted fried chicken outlets where these weathered 
Romanesque and Gothic Revival structures now stand?” 
-- Peter Steinfels, The New York Times, November 1, 19972 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 27, 2003, the National Parks Service of the Department of the Interior announced a 
$317,000 grant under the “Save America’s Treasure’s” program for the historic preservation of 
Boston’s Old North Church. 3  The church is the famous site in whose steeple lanterns were hung to 
signal to Paul Revere in 1775 that the British were coming.4  Regular worship services are still 
conducted every Sunday in the 280 year old structure.5 
This grant marks a major shift in the views of the federal government about the 
constitutionality of the federal government’s role in providing funding for the restoration of historic 
buildings currently being used for religious purposes.6  Until this shift in policy, the federal 
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST . amend. I. 
2 Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1997, at B7. 
3 News Release, National Park Service, Old North Foundation Awarded $317,000 Grant Under Save America’s Treasures 
Program, (May 27, 2003), available at http://www.nps.gov/pub_aff/pressrm.htm.   
4 The Old North Church Guidebook , at http://www.oldnorth.com/guid.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).   
5 Id. 
6 Compare Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Preservation Grants to Religious Properties, Memorandum from Walter 
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. 
Department of the Interior (Oct. 31, 1995), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.htm, available at 
www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.htm with Authority of the Department of the Interior to Provide Historic Preservation Grants to 
Historic Religious Properties such as the Old North Church, Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. Department of the 
Interior (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/OldNorthChurch.htm.  Note a similar shift in policy 
regarding FEMA under the Faith Based Initiative.  This program is now authorized to provide grants to religious 
institutions in other policy contexts.  See Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy , 
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, For the General Counsel, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/FEMAAssistance.htm. 
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government concluded that the Establishment Clause of the Constitution forbid the use of federal funds 
for the restoration of historically significant religious buildings that were also used for religious 
purposes, such as worship or religious instruction. 7  Specifically, the Park Service removed the 
provision in its application for a grant from this program that previously excluded “[h]istoric properties 
and collections associated with an active religious organization (for example, restoration of an historic 
church that is still actively used as a church).”8  This new policy, in contrast, makes such religious 
buildings eligible to receive funding from the federal Save America’s Treasures program. 9   
On May 28, 2003, the Office of Legal Counsel released an opinion concerning historic 
preservation grants to religious places.10  It was upon the authority of this Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion that the National Park Service made the grant to restore the Old North Church. 11  The opinion 
reversed the longstanding federal view that governing Supreme Court precedent prohibits such grants 
as embodied in the previously controlling opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel dated October 31, 
1995.12  Because there is no Supreme Court precedent directly on point, all analysis is based upon 
analogy to cases in the education and other fields, and conjecture about the future direction of the 
Establishment Clause doctrine.  The opinion concludes that the Constitution permits grants to houses 
of worship when they are among many beneficiaries, not defined by reference to religion, in a program 
with broad, secular goals.13  Secretary of the Interior Gale A. Norton explained the new policy of the 
administration as such: “This new policy will bring balance to our historic preservation program and 
end a discriminatory double-standard that has been applied against religious properties.  All nationally 
                                                 
7 See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra  note 6.   
8 Save America’s Treasures: FY 2002 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual and 
Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions at 1, available at 
http://www.pcah.gov/sat/SAT2002.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).   
9 2003 Memorandum; see News Release, supra note 3.   
10 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra note 6. 
11 News Release, supra note 3 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Gale A. Norton).   
12 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra  note 8. 
13 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 8, at 17. 
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significant historic structures - including those used for religious purposes - will now be eligible to 
receive funding from Save America’s Treasures program.”14 
This change in policy strikes at the heart of the sharp debate on the Supreme Court about the 
correct meaning of the Establishment Clause between two competing interpretations, separationism 
and neutralism.15  Separationism, sometimes described as the creation of a “wall of separation” 
between church and state, has been the dominant theme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence for fifty 
years.16  According to strict separationist theory, the government may not support, assist, or otherwise 
promote religion or religious institutions.  Over the past twenty years, however, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has shifted towards the neutralism theory. 17  Neutralism is premised on the idea that 
because the government may not confer a disfavored status upon religion, government may provide aid 
to religion and religious institutions if done in a neutral and non-discriminatory manner.   
The Save America’s Treasures program helps to preserve links with our past that help us 
understand who we are as a nation.  Historic religious buildings are among those places that represent 
our country’s cultural heritage.  This Note argues that if such a grant to preserve the Old North Church, 
or another religious building, is challenged, the Supreme Court would uphold these grants as valid 
under the recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Mitchell v. 
Helms.18  The regulations controlling the use of grant funds by religious institutions prohibit those 
funds from being to promote religion, and may only be used to preserve historically significant 
features.  As such, the grant program has a secular purpose, and does not have the effect of advancing 
religion.  In addition, the grant program may be sustained under the principle that religious institutions 
                                                 
14 News Release, supra note 3 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Gale A. Norton).   
15 This structure is borrowed from Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants 
to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (2002).   
16 See infra  text accompanying notes 123-143. 
17 See infra  text accompanying notes 145-162. 
18 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (O’Connor, J. concurring in judgment).   
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may not be discriminated against in the distribution of general governmental services provided on the 
basis of neutral criteria.19   
Part I of this Note considers the state of historic religious properties, the contributions they 
make to their community, and the threats they face.  Part II considers the federal laws that apply to 
historic preservation, detailing the National Historic Preservation Act and the Save America’s 
Treasures grants program.  In Part III, the Note next considers Establishment Clause jurisprudence, its 
current shift toward neutralism, and its applicability to grants to religious buildings.  The two opinions 
of the Office of Legal Counsel about the constitutionality of providing historic preservation grants to 
religious buildings are considered in Part IV.  Finally, in Part V, this Note attempts to ground in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence the arguments made by the most recent Office of Legal Counsel opinion.  
The Note determines that the Save America’s Treasures program may constitutionally provide grants 
to religious institutions, and also provides suggestions to ensure such grants remain within the limits of 
the Establishment Clause.   
I. HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND  
AMERICA’S ENDANGERED HISTORIC HOUSES OF WORSHIP 
 
 In May of 2003, the National Trust for Historic Places placed America’s Historic Urban 
Houses of Worship at the top of its list of “America’s 11 Most Endangered Historic Places,”20 a yearly 
list of important historical and cultural sites that are threatened by demolition, slow and steady 
deterioration, and neglect.21  The Trust cautioned that these houses of worship are endangered by 
declining membership, increasing maintenance costs, and in some instances “soaring real estate values 
that make selling the property an attractive proposition for shrinking congregations.”22  Moreover, if 
these buildings are allowed to deteriorate or be demolished, not only is their architectural and historical 
                                                 
19 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).   
20 National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Eleven Most Endangered Historic Places 2003, at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11most/2003/index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).   
21 See generally National Trust for Historic Preservation, 2004 Nomination Form – The Guidelines, (2004) available at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/11Most_2004_nomguidelines.pdf.  
22  National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, (2003) available at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/2003/Endangered_Urban_Worship.pdf.   
5 
value lost, but also their ability to continue to provide critical community services to people in the 
nation’s most impoverished neighborhoods.23   
  1.  Historic Value of Houses of Worship 
 “We can’t tell American history without talking about the history of our sacred places . . . We 
can’t have a strong future for our community without safeguarding the buildings (that are used for 
worship),” Senator Joseph Lieberman told an event organized by the Partners for Sacred Places, a non-
sectarian, non-profit organization dedicated to the care and active use of America’s older and historic 
sacred places.24  Indeed, much of American history has evolved in an around our houses of worship, 
providing “eloquent testimony” to the American experience and the quest for religious freedom that 
helped shape our nation. 25  The National Trust suggests that “[c]hurches, synagogues, temples and 
mosques are often the most ambitious, beloved, and architecturally significant buildings in any given 
urban neighborhood.  Their domes, towers, and spires provide identifying elements in the local skyline, 
and they attest to the diverse traditions that have created cities and towns across the country.”26   
 There are many examples of houses of worship that contribute to our nation’s historical and 
cultural legacy.  Old North Church, for example, has held its place in American history from when 
Robert Newman climbed the steeple and briefly hung the two lanterns that touched off the 
Revolutionary War.27  The lanterns, arranged for by Paul Revere, signaled the movement of British 
troops up the Charles River to Cambridge to begin a march to Lexington. 28  The shot heard round the 
world was fired on Lexington Green the following day. 29  Currently, the 280 year old church has a 
                                                 
23 Id. at 3.   
24 Partners for Sacred Places, Lieberman Announces National List of Sacred Places to Save (2002), at 
http://www.sacredplaces.org/ten_places.html#2.  Lieberman was the Democratic sponsor of crafting a compromise version 
of earlier legislation passed in the House of Representatives that would allow religious groups to accept public funds in 
order to operate faith-based social services.  Elizabeth Becker, Lieberman Joins Bush Bid To Push Aid-to-Charity Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2001, A11.   
25 National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22, at 2.   
26 Id. 
27“Paul Revere,” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2003), see generally, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Paul Revere’s Ride, in 
The Home Book of Verse 2,422 (selected & arranged by Burton E. Stevenson, 9th ed. 1950). 
28 “Paul Revere,” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2003). 
29 Id. 
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congregation of 150 members, yet because of its historical status, the church has more costs to repair 
its forty-three clear windows and to stay open for sightseers than its congregation and visitors donate.30  
The Old North Church was the first religious institution to be awarded a grant under the Save 
America’s Treasures program. 31   
The Mount Bethel Baptist Church in Washington, D.C. is another example of a church with an 
important place in our history. 32  Former slaves established the congregation in 1875.33  The church 
and its congregation were deeply involved in the Civil Rights movement, particularly Martin Luther 
King’s 1963 March on Washington, when busloads of protestors camped out and made placards at the 
church. 34  The National Trust for Historic Preservation has put the Baptist church, built in 1902, on 
their annual list of national landmarks in need of preservation, as the small congregation cannot afford 
both to provide much-needed services to the community and to upkeep its historic building.35   
The historic Baltimore Cathedral, built from 1806 to 1821, is one further example of the 
integral role houses of worship can play in the development of our country.  The Basilica of the 
National Shrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary stands as a symbol of the burgeoning 
country’s religious freedom, as it is not only the first major religious building constructed in America 
after the adoption of the Constitution, but also America’s first cathedral. 36  Three prominent Americans 
guided the Cathedral’s design and architecture: John Carroll, the country’s first bishop, later 
Archbishop of Baltimore, and cousin of Charles Carroll, who was the only Catholic to sign the 
Declaration of Independence; Benjamin Henry Latrobe, the first Architect of the U.S. Capitol; and 
                                                 
30 The Old North Church Guidebook , at http://www.oldnorth.com/guid.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).   
31  See News Release, supra  note 3. 
32  Although this Church has been listed as endangered by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, see infra note 33, no 
grant from the Save America’s Treasures program has been publicly requested.   
33 National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Trust Calls D.C.’s Mount Bethel Baptist Church “Poster Child” of 
National Epidemic, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/news/docs/20030529_11most_urbanmountbethel.html (last visited Mar. 
19, 2004).   
34 U.S. Department of State, March on Washington, at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/civilrights/anniversary/mow04.htm (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2004).   
35 National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Trust Calls D.C.’s Mount Bethel Baptist Church “Poster Child” of 
National Epidemic, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/news/docs/20030529_11most_urbanmountbethel.html, supra  note 33. 
36 Baltimore Basilica, Basilica of the National Shrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, The History of 
Americas First Cathedral, at http://www.baltimorebasilica.org/index2.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).   
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President Thomas Jefferson, whose advice and counsel guided Latrobe.37  For more than 100 years, 
until the success of the American Revolution, the Catholic Church in England’s colonies was a 
persecuted minority. 38  After the Revolution, leaders wanted to build a cathedral to celebrate their 
newfound religious freedom in America.39  Today, the Basilica’s historic trust has applied for a grant 
under the Save America’s Treasures program as it hopes to raise funds to restore the national landmark 
to the original concept of its principle architect, Benjamin Latrobe.40   
A final example of a religious institution important to our nation’s history was recently 
awarded $375,000 from Save America’s Treasures, which would have been prohibited before the 
recent change in federal policy. 41  Touro Synagogue, dedicated in 1762 in Newport, Rhode Island, is 
the oldest synagogue in the United States and the only one that survives from the colonial era.42  The 
synagogue was designed by Peter Harrison, America’s first professional architect.43   
Touro Synagogue stands as a testament to the importance of religious tolerance in our nation’s 
beginning.  In 1790, President George Washington’s visited the Synagogue and in his letter “To the 
Hebrew Congregation in Newport Rhode Island,” the President proclaimed that the United States 
“gives bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance.”44  John F. Kennedy reaffirmed the 
importance of the Synagogue saying that it “is not only the oldest Synagogue in America, but also one 
of the oldest symbols of Liberty.”45  According to the Touro Synagogue Foundation, this historic 
                                                 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Id.   
40 Id.; Frank Langfitt, Basilica Finds Itself at Center of a Constitutional Quandary; Public Grants Raise Issue of Church- 
State Separation, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 24, 2003, at 1A.   
41 Margaret Foster, Save America’s Treasures Grant Recipients Announced, PRESERVATION ONLINE, available at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/magazine/archives/arc_news/112003.htm (November 20, 2003).   
42 Rabbi Theodore Lewis, HISTORY OF TOURO SYNAGOGUE, available at http://www.tourosynagogue.org (last visited Mar. 
19, 2004).   
43 Id. 
44 George Washington, Letter from George Washington in response to Moses Seixas, available at 
http://www.tourosynagogue.org/GWLetter1.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).   
45 The Touro Synagogue Foundation, Save Touro Synagogue, 
http://www.tourosynagogue.org/capital_campaign.php?str=Save%20Touro%20Synagogue (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).   
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structure is in “dire need of critical repairs and costly improvements,” including efforts to address 
“long-standing structural problems.”46   
2.  Community Contributions 
“In our nation’s time of need . . . it should be clearer than ever what our churches, synagogues, 
mosques and temples mean to our communities.  They are much more than houses of worship.  They 
are anchoring centers of community service,” Joseph Lieberman has said.47  Beyond their physical ties 
to the community, these institutions provide significant and necessary services to their communities.48  
A survey conducted in over 100 congregations in six cities found that more than 90% of inner-city 
houses of worship serve as community centers that provide services to people in need, on average 
more than one in five of whom is not a congregation member.49  Indeed, “[t]he average congregation 
provides over 5,300 hours of volunteer support.”50  This translates into a value of an average of 
$140,000 per year from these institutions, sixteen times what they receive from the people who use 
these spaces.51   
This research also shows that a congregation’s ability to serve the community is based upon its 
facilities.52  Indeed, over 76% of all congregation-based community services take place in an historic 
property. 53  During his tenure as Director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
                                                 
46The Touro Synagogue Foundation, Restoration of Touro , at 
http://www.tourosynagogue.org/conservation.php?str=Restoration%20of%20Touro (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).   
47 Partners for Sacred Places, Lieberman Announces National List of Sacred Places to Save (2002), at 
http://www.sacredplaces.org/ten_places.html#2. 
48 See National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22, 
at 3; Daniel P. Hart, God’s Work, Caesar’s Wallet: Solving the Constitutional Conundrum of Government Aid to Faith-
Based Charities, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 1089, 1091-92 n.10 (citing Ram A. Cnaan et al., THE NEWER DEAL: SOCIAL WORK AND 
RELIGION IN PARTNERSHIP (1999) (discussing increasingly important role of religious congregations and sectarian agencies 
in providing social services and calling for “limited partnership” between social work and religion in helping those in 
need); Marvin Olasky, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992) (calling for return to social services system 
operated by religious charities instead of government bureaucracies); Joseph P. Shapiro & Andrea R. Wright, Can 
Churches Save America?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT , Sept. 9, 1996, at 46-53 (discussing increasing call by politicians 
for allowing religious charities to provide more of social safety net)). 
49 Diane Cohen & A. Robert Jaeger, SACRED PLACES AT RISK 5 (Partners for Sacred Places  ED., 1998); National Trust for 
Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22, at 3.   
50 Cohen & Jaeger, supra  note 49, at 5. 
51 Id. 
52 National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s Endangered Historic Urban Houses of Worship, supra note 22, at 3.   
53 Id. 
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Initiatives, John DiIulio has said that “[l]etting sacred places crumble or close – failing to give them 
the corporate, philanthropic and other support they need to keep the walls from falling and the pipes 
from bursting is tantamount to losing millions and millions of dollars a year in vitally needed anti-
poverty and community-building efforts.” 54   
 3. The Threat 
Many inner-city congregations have been forced to make difficult choices between providing 
necessary community services or preserving their historic properties as they struggle to make ends 
meet.55  Demographic changes in the last half-century have lead to severe declines in membership, and 
thus, financial resources.56  As a result, crucial repairs have frequently been postponed and the deferred 
maintenance has lead to roof leaks, plumbing and electrical problems, and other severe structural 
concerns.57  In a representative group of ten historic urban houses of worship in one of the poorest 
census tracks in North Philadelphia, for example, the average inner-city facility faces repairs in the 
range of $1 million to $2 million. 58  The Partners for Sacred Places estimate that 20% of all historic 
houses of worship are expected to suffer partial collapse or worse in the next five years.59   
II. THE FEDERAL SCHEME: NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT AND THE 
SAVE AMERICA’S TREASURES PROGRAM 
 
A. National Historic Preservation Act 
In 1966, Congress, motivated by at least two concerns, enacted the National Historic 
Preservation Act (“NHPA”).60  The first concern was the recognition that large numbers of historic 
structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed with little or no consideration of their value as 
                                                 
54 Id. at 4. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Cohen & Jaeger, supra note 49. 
59 Id. 
60 National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470, et seq. (2000).   
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historic properties or the possibility of preserving the properties in economically productive ways.61  
The second consideration was a belief that structures with historic, cultural, or architectural 
significance enhance the quality of life for the community.62  As such, Congress declared the purposes 
of the NHPA to include in part that: 
(1) the spirit and direction of the nation are founded upon and reflected in its     
historic heritage; 
(2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living 
part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of 
orientation to the American people; . . .  
(4) the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its 
vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and 
energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of 
Americans;  
(7) although the major burdens of historic preservation have been borne and major 
effects initiated by private agencies and individuals, and both should continue to 
play a vital role, it is nevertheless necessary and appropriate for the Federal 
Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs and activities, to 
give maximum encouragement to support by private means, and to assist State 
and local governments and the Nation Trust for Historic Preservation in the 
United States to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and 
activities.63   
 
In keeping with these purposes, the NHPA authorizes the Department of the Interior to 
provide grants to owners of historic properties and to the states for preserving historic properties.  
These programs require that any property receiving such grants must be listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places, (“National Register”) a list maintained by the Secretary of the Interior of 
“district, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture, 
archeology, engineering, and culture.”64  The criteria for evaluating a property for listing on the 
National Register are set out in the applicable regulations and include consideration of: 
“[t]he quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, 
engineering, and culture as present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects 
                                                 
61 Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1978) (explaining the purposes underlying the national, 
state and local level historic preservation legislation).   
62 Id.   
63 16 U.S.C. § 470-1.   
64 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A). 
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that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and 
association and: 
(a) that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the 
broad patterns of out history; or 
(b) that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or 
(c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of 
construction or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high 
artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose 
components may lack individual distinction; or 
(d) that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory 
or history. 65 
 
A property need only satisfy one of the four criteria for listing on the National Register.66   
It is important to note that under current Department of Interior regulations governing inclusion 
in the National Register, historical religious properties must meet a higher standard than historic 
secular properties.  The guidelines provide that properties “owned by religious institutions or used for 
religious purposes” are “[o]rdinarily” deemed ineligible for the National Register.67  Only under an 
exception contained in the regulations for “religious property deriving primary significance from 
architectural or artistic distinction or historical importance,” could a religious property be listed on the 
National Register. 68   If a religious property meets these heightened standards, however, a 1992 
amendment to the NHPA specifically provides that “grants may be made under this subsection for the 
preservation, stabilization, restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National 
Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, does not promote religion, 
and seeks to protect those qualities that are historically significant.”69  Even after this amendment was 
passed, however, and until the 2003 Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, the executive branch 
declined to provide grants to religious properties.70   
                                                 
65 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2004). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
6916 U.S.C. § 470a(e)(4). 
70 See, e.g. Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III, supra  note 6, at 1 (noting that Save America’s Treasures grant was 
awarded to Old North Church, but the Park Service reversed its position shortly thereafter relying upon Memorandum from 
Walter Dellinger,  supra  note 6). 
12 
Designation as a historic property may impose certain burdens and responsibilities on the 
property owner.  The NHPA imposes certain restrictions on the federal government when a federal 
“undertaking” or “licensed” activity may affect a National Register property. 71  The federal agency 
involved must consult with the federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and must consider 
and take into account the effect on the historic property. 72  Although listing on the National Register 
does not itself affect what a private property owner may do with his property, designation as a historic 
property can have significant ramifications under relevant state and local laws.73   
B. Save America’s Treasures Program 
The Save America’s Treasures program is a national effort to protect “America’s threatened 
cultural treasures, including historic structures, collections, works of art, maps and journals that 
document and illuminate the history and culture of the United States.”74  Established by Executive 
Order in February 1998 by President Clinton, Save America’s Treasures was originally founded as the 
centerpiece of the White House National Millennium Commemoration and as a public-private 
partnership that included the White House, the National Park Service, and the National Trust for 
Historic Preservation. 75  The Program provides matching grants for preservation of “the enduring 
symbols of American tradition that define us as a nation.”76  Matching Save America’s Treasures 
                                                 
71 16 U.S.C. § 470a(f). 
72 Id. 
73 See, e.g., Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1101 (1981), et seq.; Landmark’s 
Preservation Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq.  
Another controversy closely related to the one at issue in this Note is whether placing requirements upon a house 
of worship once it is deemed a historic landmark is an infringement upon the free exercise of religion in violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause.  See, e.g., Catherine Maxson, “Their Preservation is Our Sacred Trust” -- Judicially Mandated Free 
Exercise Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances under Employment Division v. Smith, 45 B.C. L. REV. 205 
(2003); Laura S. Nelson, Remove Not the Ancient Landmark: Legal Protection for Historic Religious Properties in an Age 
of Religious Freedom Legislation, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 721, 730 (1999); Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Ministry v. 
Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65 TEMP . L. REV. 91, 93 (1992); 
Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and 
Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401, 402 (1991).  This issue is beyond the scope of this Note.   
74 Exec. Order No. 13072, 63 FR 6041 (Feb. 2, 1998).   
75 Id.  The Program was established in 1998 pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 
470 to 470x-6 (2000).  Funding for the Program is provided by the Historic Preservation Fund, which was created by the 
NHPA. See 16 U.S.C. § 470h. 
76 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-63, 115 Stat. 414, 425 
(2001). 
13 
grants are available for work on “na tionally significant intellectual and cultural artifacts and nationally 
significant historic structures and sites.”77  Past grantees include Montpelier, the home of James 
Madison in Montpelier Station, Virginia; the Star Spangled Banner at the Smithsonian Institute; 
Harriet Tubman Residence and Home for the Aged in Auburn, New York; and Ellis Island in New 
Jersey. 78  
Grants require a dollar- for-dollar non-federal match, which can be in the form of cash or 
donated services.79  The minimum grant request for collections projects is $50,000; the minimum grant 
request for historic property projects is $250,000 and the maximum grant request for all projects is $1 
million. 80  In 2003, the average federal grant award to collections was $172,000 and the average award 
to historic properties was $268,000.81  
Six categories of entities, including both public and private institutions, are eligible to apply for 
Save America’s Treasures grants: federal agencies funded by the Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act; other federal agencies collaborating with a nonprofit partner to 
preserve the historic properties or collections owned by the federal agency; non-profit, tax-exempt 
501(c)(3), U.S organizations; units of state or local government; federally recognized Indian Tribes; 
and historic properties and collections associated with active religious organizations.82  Applications 
are reviewed and ranked on the basis of extensive criteria, primarily related to historical significance.83  
Most importantly, the applicant must demonstrate the property’s “national significance,” as that term is 
                                                 
77 Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual 
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions at 1, available at 
http://www.pcah.gov/GuidelinesSAT2003.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).   
Guidelines and application materials for the 2004 grant program will be available in early 2004.  See National 
Parks Service, Save America’s Treasures Federal Grants, at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).   
78 Save America’s Treasures, Official Project Profiles, at http://www.saveamericastreasures.org/profiles.htm (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2004).   
79 Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual 
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77, at 1; 
National Parks Service, Save America’s Treasures Federal Grants, at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures, supra note 77.   
80 National Parks Service, Save America’s Treasures Federal Grants, at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures, supra  note 77.   
81 Id. 
82 Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual 
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77, at 1. 
83 Id. at 4.   
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defined by the Guidelines.84  The criteria set out by the Guidelines for “national significance,” 
although similar to those for listing on the National Register, focus more acutely on the property’s 
value to the nation as a whole, and not simply its value in a particular community. 85  Applications not 
meeting this criterion will not receive further consideration. 86  This requires a showing that the 
property possesses “exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the intellectual and 
cultural heritage and the built environment of the United States,” that it possesses “a high degree of 
integrity,” and that it is associated with events, persons, ideas, or ideals that are especially significant 
in American history. 87  In addition, to qualify as nationally significant, the historic property must have 
been either designated as a National Historic Landmark or listed as a place of “national significance” 
in the National Register, or be deemed eligible for such designation or listing.88  In addition to 
“national significance,” Save America’s Treasures grant applicants must also demonstrate that the 
historic property is “threatened” or “endangered,” or that it has an “urgent preservation and/or 
conservation need.”89  Additionally, the proposed project “must address the threat and must have 
                                                 
84 Id. at 4.  Guidelines quality of national significance is ascribed to collections and historic properties that possess 
exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the intellectual and cultural heritage and the built environment of 
the United States, that possess a high degree of integrity and: 
· That are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to, and are identified with, or that 
outstandingly represent the broad patterns of United States history and culture and from which an 
understanding and appreciation of those patterns may be gained; or, 
· That are associated importantly with the lives of persons nationally significant in the United States history or 
culture; or, 
· That represent great historic, cultural, artistic or scholarly ideas or ideals of the American people; or, 
· That embody the distinguishing characteristics of a resource type  
o that is exceptionally valuable for the study of a period or theme of United States history or culture; or 
o that represents a significant, distinctive and exceptional entity whose components may lack individual 
dis tinction but that collectively form an entity of exceptional historical, artistic or cultural 
significance (e.g., an historic district with national significance), or 
o that outstandingly commemorate or illustrate a way of life or culture; or, 
· That have yielded or may be likely to yield information of major importance by revealing or by shedding light 
upon periods or themes of United States history or culture. 
85 Compare 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (National Register “Criteria considerations” with Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic 
Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and 
Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77, at 4. 
86 Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual 
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77, at 4. 
87 Id.; see source cited supra  note 77. 
88 Id. at 5.   
89 Id. 
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educational, interpretive, or training value and a clear public benefit (for example, historic places open 
for visitation or collections ava ilable for public viewing or scholarly research).”90  Finally, the project 
must be “feasible (i.e., able to be accomplished within the proposed activities, schedule and budget 
described in the application), and the applicant must demonstrate ability to complete the project and 
match the federal funds.”91  
After the Park Service completes its ranking of the applicants,92 a panel of experts with 
professional expertise in fields such as history, preservation, conservation, archeology rank 
applications and make funding recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior.93  In order to insulate 
the panel members from external influence, the Department of the Interior does not disclose their 
identity to the public.94  The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the President’s Committee 
on the Arts and the Humanities, will select applicants and forward those selections to the House and 
Senate Committees on Appropriations for concurrence.95   
Applicants that qualify for a grant under the substantive criteria discussed above must also 
satisfy a number of administrative requirements before a grant will be awarded.  Because projects 
funded by the Program are “undertakings” within the meaning of the Historic Preservation Act,96 the 
Park Service requires that grant recipients consult with their State Historic Preservation Officer and the 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. Applications are evaluated and selected based on the following criteria: the relative national significance of properties 
are evaluated and accounts for 30% of its total evaluation score; the nature, the extent, and the level of severity of the threat, 
danger or damage to the collection or historic property accounts for 25% of its total score; how the proposed preservation or 
conservation work will significantly diminish or eliminate the threat, danger or damage, and the clear public benefit of the 
project accounts for 25% of the score; and the project budget and ability to secure the required non-federal match that must 
be used during the grant period will account for 20% of the total score. 
93 Id. at 4. 
94 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 6, at 2 (citing Letter for Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, from William G. Myers III, Solicitor, Department of the Interior at 3 (Jan. 24, 2003).   
95 Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant Intellectual 
and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77, at 4. 
      This provision, however, is unenforceable. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
96 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2000). 
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Advisory Council on Historic Preservation prior to the receipt of funds.97  In addition, grant recipients 
must agree to encumber the title to their property with a fifty year covenant that runs with the land that 
provides that the owners “shall repair, maintain, and administer the premises so as to preserve the 
historical integrity of the features, materials, appearance, workmanship, and setting that made the 
property eligible for the Nationa l Register of Historic Places.”98  Finally, because grants for the repair 
and development of historic properties are provided “only for the benefit of the public,” “interior work 
(other than mechanical systems such as plumbing or wiring), or work not visible from the public way, 
must be open to the public at least 12 days a year during the 50-year term of the preservation easement 
or covenant.”99  There is no requirement of notice to the public of the property’s historical 
significance.100   
Save America’s Treasures grantees must also keep detailed records of their expenditures and 
are subject to audit by the government to ensure that the Save America’s Treasures grants are spent 
only for designated purposes.101  The Act expressly requires grantees to maintain “records which fully 
disclose the disposition by the beneficiary of the proceeds of such assistance, the total cost of the 
project or undertaking in connection with which such assistance is given or used, and the amount and 
nature of that portion of the cost of the project or undertaking supplied by other sources, and such other 
records as will facilitate an effective audit.”102  These requirements ensure that federal funds are not 
used for unauthorized purposes.103 
                                                 
97 See 36 C.F.R. 800.3 (2004); Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve 
Nationally Significant Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application 
Instructions, supra  note 77, at 3. 
98 Id. at 3-4. 
99 Id. 
100 See generally id. 
101 16 U.S.C. § 470e (2000).   
102 Id.  
103 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 6, at 3.   
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III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
SHIFT TO NEUTRALISM 
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”104  Religious liberty and separation of church and 
state are the cornerstones of the American way of life.  The Framers of the Constitution designed the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses to embrace two key concepts: the government will not endorse or 
oppose any particular religious viewpoint (or religion generally), and will not interfere with the right of 
citizens to practice their faith.  James Madison, the father of the United States Constitution, once 
observed, “The [religious] devotion of the people has been manifestly increased by the total separation 
of the church from the state.”105  Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black also expressed the purpose and 
function of the Establishment Clause when he said that it rests “on the belief that a union of 
government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion.”106 
The issue at the core of this Note is whether facially neutral laws that provide funding to 
religious institutions, and are not shown to have been applied for the purpose of helping, hurting, or 
discriminating among religions, are an establishment of religion prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause.  Namely, may government support for the preservation of historically important buildings 
include religious buildings?   
Two schools of thought have developed regarding this kind of support for religious institutions.  
Separationism, described as the creation of a “wall of separation” between church and state, has been 
the dominant theme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence for fifty years.107  According to strict 
                                                 
104 U.S. CONST . amend. I. 
105 Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Mar. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1808-1819, at 432 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908); see generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“In the words of Jefferson, the 
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’”); 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s belief that religion is “a matter which lies 
solely between man and his God” and that the Establishment Clause essentially builds a “wall of separation between church 
and state.”) 
106 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (viewing the purpose of the Establishment Clause as resting on the belief 
that “a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion”). 
107 See infra  text accompanying notes 123-143. 
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separationist theory, the government may not support, assist, or otherwise promote religion or religious 
institutions because of the inseparability of the secular and sectarian characters of such 
organizations.108  Over the past twenty years, however, Supreme Court jurisprudence has shifted 
towards the neutralism theory. 109  Neutralism espouses that the “Constitution requires, at a minimum, 
neutrality not hostility toward religion,”110 that the government may not confer a disfavored status 
upon religion, but may provide aid to religion and religious institutions if done in a neutral and non-
discriminatory manner.  As such, neutralists argue that the government must include religious 
institutions in social programs on the same terms as other institutions, and that the religious identity of 
those institutions should not be of concern to government as long as private parties create that religious 
content and no one is coerced into religious participation. 111   
The administration’s change in policy regarding historic preservation grants to religious 
buildings feeds into this debate about the correct meaning of the Establishment Clause between these 
two competing interpretations.112  Although the Supreme Court has recently redefined its own 
conception of the Establishment Clause,113 Justice Thomas believes that this apparent, yet incomplete 
doctrinal shift has caused “growing confusion among the lower courts.”114   As such, he suggests that 
the Court “cannot long avoid addressing the important issues”115 illustrated, for example, by the 
question of whether the government may provide grants to religious historic properties.   
                                                 
108 Lupu & Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, supra note 15; see also  Lupu & 
Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, supra note 15.   
109 See infra  text accompanying notes 145-162. 
110 Columbia Union College v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1999) (Thomas, J. dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari).    
111 Lupu & Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, supra note 15; see also  Lupu & 
Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, supra note 15.   
112 Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, New Federal Policies on Grants for Disaster Relief or Historic Preservation at Houses of 
Worship and Places of Religious Instruction, Roundtable Publications, at 
http://www.religionandsocialpolict.org/legal/legal_update.cfm?id=16 (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).   
113 See infra text accompanying notes 131-48; Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2001).  In Columbia 
College , the Fourth Circuit recently ruled that Mitchell had “buried” the presumption that government aid to “pervasively 
sectarian” schools is unconstitutional.  Id. at 504.  The court alternatively went on to affirm the district court’s finding that 
the funding program was constitutional because the College is not, in fact, pervasively sectarian.  Id. at 508-09. 
114 Clark , 527 U.S. at 1014 (1999) (Thomas, J. dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari).    
115 Id.  Note that the Court has decided Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), since Justice Thomas made this statement.  
Because of the lack of a majority opinion, however, the muddled jurisprudence in this area is still causing confusion.  See 
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A. The Lemon Test 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to give protection from the 
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”116  In 
1971, the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurzman set out a three-part test to assess a statute’s 
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause.117  For a statute to be consistent with the 
Establishment Clause, the law: (1) must have a secular purpose; (2) must have a primary effect that 
neither materially inhibits nor advances religion; and (3) must not excessively entangle religion and 
governmental institutions.118  The Lemon test, however, has been applied in an inconsistent manner, 
thus rendering the test less than dispositive.119  Although the test has been ignored by some Justices, 
and sharply criticized by others,120 it has been recently applied in a modified form more in accord with 
the neutralist theory. 121  In fact, the same year as the Lemon test was adopted, the Supreme Court 
cautioned about applying the test too inflexibly: “[t]he standards should rather be viewed as guidelines 
with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clause have been impaired.  
And as we have noted in Lemon, candor compels the acknowledgement that we can only dimly 
                                                                                                                                                                       
generally Anthony Kovalchick, Educational Aid Programs under the Establishment Clause: The Need for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to Adopt the Rule Proposed by the Mitchell Plurality, 30 S.U. L. REV. 117, 185-86 (2003).   
116 Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) 
117 403 U.S. 203 (1997). 
118 Id. at 612-13. 
119 See, e.g. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down state remedial education programs administered in part 
in parochial schools); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislative chaplains). 
120 Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter have all criticized the Lemon test. Justice White, who 
dissented from the decision in Lemon, also has strongly criticized the test.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 
(1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 
573, 655-79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “persuasive criticism of Lemon has 
emerged”); Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1990) (statement of nominee); Lamb’s Chapel v. 
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (Justice Scalia lamented that the test is “like some ghoul in a 
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.” 
Justice Scalia accused the Lemon test of “stalking” Establishment Clause jurisprudence and pointed out to the Court that 
“when we wish to strike down a practice [Lemon] forbids, we invoke it ...; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we 
ignore it entirely.”) 
121 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality). 
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perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional 
adjudication.”122 
B. Separationist Doctrine  
 During its separationist period, the Supreme Court limited direct money grants that went to 
religious institutions.  The cases below are the main cases in which the Court has considered the 
constitutionality of such grants.  They demonstrate that the Court held that the Establishment Clause 
required that aid from governments to religious institutions had to be used to support only secular 
activities, and then only if the religious character of the institution was not pervasive.   
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue of governmental support for buildings associated 
with religious institutions in 1899,123 more than a century after the First Amendment was ratified.124  In 
Bradfield v. Roberts, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that provided direct funds to a hospital 
run by the Roman Catholic Church but devoted exclusively to caring for those with contagious 
diseases.125  The Court focused on the building’s purposes, and not the identity of the owner, to find 
that because those purposes were secular, there was no establishment of religion. 126   
 At the height of the separationist era in the Supreme Court, the Court in Tilton v. Richardson 
sustained a federal statute that provided construction grants to religious colleges and universities for 
libraries and other buildings devoted to science, music, and art.127  The program explicitly excluded aid 
to facilities “used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship.”128  The Court concluded 
that because the schools that had received the grants had not been shown to be pervasively sectarian, 
                                                 
122 Titlon v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); see also  Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 368, 394 (1983) (“Our cases have 
also emphasized that [Lemon] provides ‘no more than [a] helpful signpost’ in dealing with Establishment Clause 
challenges.”).   
123  Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
124 On September 25, 1789, the First Congress of the United States proposed to the state legislatures twelve amendments to 
the Constitution that attempted to meet those arguments most frequently advanced against it. These amendments were 
ratified December 15, 1791.  “Constitution of the United States of America,”  ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2003).   
125 175 U.S. 291, 293 (1899). 
126 Id. 
127 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).  The Court decided Tilton on the same day in 1971 as Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
128 Id. at 675. 
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and had maintained the federally supported buildings in a secular fashion, no constitutional violation 
had occurred.129  Although the Court upheld most of this program, it unanimously struck down a 
provision that would have returned the new building to the exclusive control of its owner after twenty 
years without restriction on religious use.130  Because this reversion meant that after twenty years the 
government might be effectively subsidizing worship or instruction, the Court held that the restriction 
on religious use must extend for the life of the building. 131  The Court also noted that in such cases, the 
“crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the 
legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion.”132   
Two years later, the Court further solidified its separationist doctrine by extending the “secular 
use” principle of Bradfield and Tilton.  The Court in Hunt v. McNair upheld state issuance of revenue 
bonds for use at a religiously affiliated college, but only on the condition that the financed structures 
never be used for religious worship or instruction. 133  The Court found that the purpose of the law was 
secular, and there was no evidence that religion was so pervasive in the college that a substantial 
portion of its functions was religious.134  Thus, the Court held, the primary effect of the law as applied 
to the college would not be to advance religion.135  “The Court has not accepted the recurrent argument 
that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources 
on religious ends.”136  In addition, there was no evidence of potential excessive entanglement because 
the state would not become involved unless the college failed to make its rent payments.137 
On the same day, in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the 
Court reaffirmed the principle that the Establishment Clause prohibits government construction or 
                                                 
129 Id. at 686-69. 
130 Id. at 683. 
131 Id. 683-84. 
132 Id. at 679. 
133 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973). 
134 Id. at 741-42. 
135 Id. at 743-45. 
136 Id. at 743. 
137 Id. at 745-46. 
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repair of buildings used for religious worship or instruction. 138  This case most directly addresses the 
issue of direct government funding for existing buildings used for religious purposes.  In Nyquist, the 
Court held unconstitutional New York State’s program of “maintenance and repair” grants for the 
upkeep of religious schools and equipment.139  The grants were allocated per student, but were only 
available to private, nonpublic schools in low-income areas, “all or practically all of which were 
Catholic.”140  The court held that the maintenance and repair provision violated the Establishment 
Clause because its effect, inevitably, was to subsidize and advance the religious mission of these 
schools.141  Although noting that “an indirect and incidental benefit to religious institutions has never 
been thought a sufficient defect to warrant the inva lidation of a state law,”142 the Court reasoned that 
“if the state may not erect buildings in which religious activities take place, it may not maintain such 
buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair.”143  The Court has never repudiated 
Nyquist,144 and thus, it likely stands as the relevant precedent for government support for structures 
used primarily for religious purposes.   
C. Current State of Establishment Clause Doctrine and Doctrinal Shift Toward Neutralism  
The Supreme Court has notably shifted towards neutralism in its recent cases involving 
government assistance to religious schools.  In these cases, the Court has effectively renounced the 
notion that all assistance to secular institutions is forbidden.  None of these cases, however, relate 
directly to governmental support for religious buildings.  Therefore, the following cases are only 
suggestive of the direction of Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence.   
                                                 
138 Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).  Note that the Court’s decision of the 
Court’s decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), turned on the Nyquist decision.  The holding of 
Zelman, however, does not extend to the portion of Nyquist dealing with “maintenance and repair” grants.  Nyquist, 413 
U.S. at 768. 
139 Id. at 794. 
140 Id. at 768. 
141 Id. at 794. 
142 Id. at 775. 
143 Id. at 777. 
144  See supra  note 138. 
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In Agostini v. Felton, the question was whether public employees could provide on site- 
remedial instruction to students attending sectarian school in educationally deprived areas. 145   The 
purpose of the program was to provide the same opportunities for remedial instruction as were 
available to public school students.146  The Court upheld the program and in doing so reaffirmed but 
modified the Lemon test.147  Under the modified Lemon test, courts look to: (1) whether the 
government had a secular purpose; and (2) whether the aid has the effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion. 148  Three “primary criteria” are used in the “effects test” inquiry: (1) whether the aid results in 
governmental indoctrination; (2) whether the aid program defines its recipients by reference to 
religion; and (3) whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement between government and 
religion. 149  The Court made clear that government aid to religious institutions is less likely to 
subsidize religion (and thus result in governmental indoctrination) where “the aid is allocated on the 
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both 
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.”150  The Court emphasized that the 
program in this case was neutral from the perspective of religion, was directed at supporting students 
and not institutions, and was carefully designed to avoid promoting the sectarian goals of the schools at 
which the program operated.151   
In Mitchell v. Helms, the Court addressed whether a federal program that provides government 
aid in materials and equipment to public and private schools, was a law respecting an establishment of 
religion. 152  The law required that all items purchased under the program had to be secular in nature 
and no item purchased under the program could be used for sectarian purposes.153  The Court upheld 
                                                 
145 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997). 
146 Id. at 210. 
147 Id. at 237. 
148 Id. at 231. 
149 Id. at 234. 
150 Id. at 231. 
151 Id. at 234-35. 
152 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality). 
153 Id. at 802-03. 
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the program, but without a majority opinion. 154  The four-person plurality adopted a neutralist 
perspective, applying the two-part test adopted in Agostini.155  First, did the government program seek 
to indoctrinate religion? 156  In answer to this question, the Court held that because the equipment and 
materials were themselves secular and that sectarian uses were forbidden, the program did not seek to 
indoctrinate religion. 157  Second, the Court asked if the recipients of the aid were selected by reference 
to religion, and found that the law determined eligibility neutrally and based on private choices, and as 
such, recipients were not selected on the basis of religious criteria.158    
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the opinion. 159  O’Connor agreed that 
the aid program was constitutional, but disagreed with the “singular importance” that the plurality had 
placed on neutrality. 160  O’Connor believed the constitutionality of the program resulted from the 
confluence of several factors: the neutral, secular criteria under which the aid was awarded; the fact 
that the aid supplemented and did not supplant the existing curriculum; the fact that no religious 
schools received government funds; the fact that the items purchased and loaned were secular; the fact 
that evidence of actual diversion was de minimis; and the inclusion in the program of adequate 
safeguards against diversion. 161  As such, O’Connor concluded that the program neither advanced nor 
inhibited religion.162  By combining the plurality and the concurrence, it seems that the government 
may under some circumstances provide religious institutions with aid, even if it is potentially divertible 
to religious purposes.   
                                                 
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 808 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).   
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 809-13. 
158 Id. at 813-14. 
159 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (O’Connor, J. concurring).   
160 Id. at 837. 
161 Id. at 849. 
162 Id. at 867. 
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IV.  GOVERNMENT POLICY 
A.  Prior Policy 
The former federal policy, which seems to date back to the Carter administration and was 
explicitly adopted by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, prohibited federal grants for 
repair or preservation of properties dedicated to worship or religious instruction. 163  This policy was 
memorialized in the 1995 opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel by Assistance Attorney General 
Walter Dellinger.164  The opinion concludes that the “question of government aid to religious 
institutions is a very difficult one. . . . We think, however, that a court applying current precedent is 
most likely to conclude that the direct award of historic preservation grants to churches and other 
pervasively sectarian institutions violates the Establishment Clause.”165   
The opinion makes three major points in support of its finding.  First, Supreme Court precedent 
suggests that federal grants may not be provided to “pervasively sectarian” institutions.166  The reason 
for this prohibition is the risk that where secular and religious activities are “inextricably intertwined,” 
any government aid, even if limited to a secular purpose, will inevitably advance the religious purpose 
as well.167  The assumption is that secular elements cannot be separated from the overall religious 
mission of the ins titution. 168  Secondly, any effort to distinguish the sectarian from the religious 
elements of active houses of worship is not feasible and may require “monitoring for the subtle or 
overt presence of religious matter” prohibited by the Establishment Clause.169  Such an effort would 
necessitate an inquiry into the religious doctrine or beliefs that may impermissibly entangle the 
                                                 
163 Louis R. Cohen, Religious Freedoms: Historic Preservation Grants and the Establishment Clause, ALI-ABA Course of 
Study Materials: Historic Preservation Law, at 4 (Oct. 2001). 
164 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra  note 8. 
165 Id. at 5. 
166 Id. at 2 (citing Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743).   
167 Id. at 3 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975) (invalidating provision to pervasively sectarian schools 
of instructional material “earmarked for secular purposes”) (citing Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 610).   
168 Id. (citing Meek , 421 U.S. at 363).   
169 Id. (citing Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 694 (1989)).   
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government with religion. 170  Finally, this opinion argues that historic preservation grants are not 
generally available, but rather are awarded on the basis of subjective criteria requiring an evaluation of 
historical importance and architectural and artistic distinction. 171  The application of subjective criteria 
in the context of a competitive grant program may require or reflect governmental judgments about the 
relative value of religious enterprises.172  The opinion concludes that although recent Supreme Court 
precedent has “emphasized the importance of neutrality in upholding governmental programs against 
Establishment Clause challenge,” there is no authority to depart from the policy that funds should not 
be provided directly to religious institutions.173   
B. 2003 Opinion 
 On May 28, 2003, the Office of Legal Counsel released its opinion concerning historic 
preservation grants to places of religious worship and instruction. 174  The new opinion reversed the 
long-standing policy that Supreme Court precedent prohibited such grants.  This opinion concludes 
that the Establishment Clause does not forbid grants to houses of worship when they are among a 
broad range of beneficiaries, not defined by reference to religion, in a program with neutral application 
and broad, secular goals.175  It seems that, given the indecision and doctrinal confusion in the Supreme 
Court, the opinion attempted to answer any potential constitutional question that may be asked.176    
 First, the opinion argues that the federal government has a substantial interest in preserving all 
sites of historic significance to the nation, whether those sites are secular or sectarian. 177  This interest 
makes these grants distinguishable from those given to educational institutions, where the concerns 
                                                 
170 Id. (citing Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-97 (“[R]equiring the Government to distinguish between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ 
benefits or services [provided by Church of Scientology auditing sessions] may be fraught with the sort of entanglement 
that the Constitution forbids.’”)). 
171 Id. (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-45 (subsidization of printing costs generally available to all student 
publications); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757-59, 763 (1995) (access to public 
square generally available for all displays); Westside Cmty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990) (O’Connor, 
J.) (access to school facilities available to all student clubs, with students free to organize additional clubs)).   
172 Id. at 4 (citing Pinette, 515 U.S. at 757-59, 763-6; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252).   
173 Id. at 5. 
174 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 6. 
175 Id. at 17. 
176 See infra  text accompanying notes 202- 302. 
177 Id. at 7-8. 
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about religious indoctrination are particularly strong. 178  As such, the historic preservation grants 
should not be subjected to as rigorous a scrutiny as that given to religious educational institutions.179 
 Second, Save America’s Treasures grants are analogous to aid that qualifies as “general 
governmental services,” such as police protection and fire fighting because they preserve landmarks of 
nationwide significance.180  These governmental services may be provided to religious institutions if 
they are made available on the basis of neutral criteria.181  If these services were denied to religious 
institutions, religion would be handicapped.182  In this case, the class of beneficiaries is so broad as to 
encompass any and all kinds of historic structure whether owned by public or private sources, secular 
or sectarian. 183  Thus, the breadth of eligibility suggests that these historic preservation grants are 
simply a permissible general government service.184 
The opinion next emphasized the neutrality of the criteria for selecting Save America’s 
Treasures grantees.185  The opinion suggests that although a number of the criteria allow for discretion, 
they are amenable to neutral application. 186  The opinion argues that the neutrality of the criteria, with 
the limited allowance for subjective decision-making, and the diverse makeup of structures that have 
been preserved under the Program, indicate that the Program is not skewed toward religion. 187   
                                                 
178 Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (noting “particular [establishment] concerns that arise in the 
context of public elementary and secondary schools”); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “two 
types of aid recipients heighten Establishment Clause concern: pervasively religious schools and primary and secondary 
religious schools”); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772.) 
179 Id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613-18 (1988)). 
180 Id. at 9 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947)). 
181 Id. at 9 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981), (“[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of 
groups is an important index of secular effect.”); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (“we have 
consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without 
reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge”);  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. 
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994) (“we have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit 
provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges”)). 
182 Id. at 8 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.) 
183 Id. at 9.   
184 Id. at 
185 Id. at 10.   
186 Id. at 12. 
187 Id. at 12-13 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)). 
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The opinion felt that for the above reasons, no reasonable observer would feel that this Program 
was an endorsement of religion. 188  Rather, an informed observer would understand that a government 
grant from this Program is not a payment for the endorsement of religion, but rather a payment for the 
preservation of a structure that is important to the country’s history. 189   
The opinion emphasizes that the Save America’s Treasures grants are not to be used to promote 
religion as set out by statute and regulation. 190  Audit rules and other aspects of the Program work to 
ensure that Save America’s Treasures grants are used for their stated purpose and not used to promote 
religion. 191   
The opinion next analogizes this Establishment Clause issue here with the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in two separate but related doctrines, free speech and the free exercise of religion. 192  
The opinion notes the move towards neutralism in these analogous areas.193  The opinion first 
describes a line of cases that hold that the Free Speech Clause does not permit the government to deny 
religious groups equal access to the government’s own property even where those groups will use that 
property for religious worship or instruction. 194  The opinion then suggests that the denial of grants to 
religious institutions because of their religious identity is to single out religious activity for special and 
burdensome treatment, a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.195  The opinion here argues that parallel 
                                                 
188 Id. at 13.   
189 Id. (citing Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842-44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). 
190 Id. at 13-14.  (“To begin with, under the NHPA, properties that are owned by religious institutions or used for religious 
purposes are eligible for Save America’s Treasures grants only if they “deriv[e] primary significance from architectural or 
artistic distinction or historical importance,” 36 C.F.R. § 60.4(a), and “[g]rants may be made .  . . for the preservation, 
stabilization, restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National Register of Historic Places, provided 
that the purpose of the grant is secular, does not promote religion, and seeks to protect those qualities that are historically 
significant ,” 16 U.S.C. § 470a(e)(4) (emphasis added).”) 
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 15, 15-16. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 15 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384, 394 (1993); Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); see also  Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)). 
195 Id. at 15-16 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (government may not “impose special 
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status”); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 532 (1993) (“[a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates 
against some or all religious beliefs”); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 390 (1990) (to 
“single out” religious activity “for special and burdensome treatment” would violate the Free Exercise Clause)).   
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Supreme Court doctrine prohibits the discrimination against religion under the Free Exercise Clause.196  
To deny houses of worship otherwise available grants directly implicates that anti-discrimination 
jurisprudence.197   The opinion suggests that the Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift towards non-
discrimination against religion in these two analogous areas suggests that the Court would carry that 
same principle over into its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.   
The opinion concludes by suggesting that even though the relevant Supreme Court precedent, 
Tilton and Nyquist have not been explicitly overruled, the Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
evolved since those decisions were rendered, and as such, they may no longer be good law. 198  
Agostini and Mitchell overturned many principles that underlie the decisions in Tilton and Nyquist.199  
Specifically, the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine, that held that there are certain religious institutions 
in which religion is so pervasive that no governmental aid may be provided to them, because the ir 
performance of even secular acts will be infused with religious purposes, no longer enjoys support 
from a majority of the court.200   
V. HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
The opinion identifies policy considerations and considers factors that may be relevant in a 
constitutional challenge to the Save America’s Treasures grant program.  This Note, while agreeing 
with the conclusion of the opinion, attempts to more concretely ground the many arguments made by 
the opinion in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  This analysis may more accurately reflect an actual 
judicial response to such a challenge.  It is important to note, and has been demonstrated above, that 
                                                 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at14-16. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. at 16 (stating that “[f]our Justices expressly abandoned it in Mitchell, see 530 U.S. at 825-29 (plurality opinion), and 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in that case set forth reasoning that is inconsistent with its underlying premises, see id. at 857-
58 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Breyer, J.) (requiring proof of actual diversion of public support to 
religious uses to invalidate direct aid to schools and explaining that “presumptions of religious indoctrination are normally 
inappropriate when evaluating neutral school-aid programs under the Establishment Clause”); see also Columbia Union 
Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 502-04 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the pervasively sectarian test is no longer valid in 
light of the holdings of six Justices in Mitchell).”). 
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the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in flux, with a shift toward neutralism.201  Thus, this Note 
suggests two different approaches the Court may take in approaching a grant to a historic religious 
institution under the Save America’s Treasures grant program. 202  First, this Note will consider whether 
the grant program is constitutional under the doctrine of direct aid of funding to religious institutions.  
Secondly, this Note will consider whether the grant program can be upheld as a general governmental 
service.    
A.  Direct Aid Approach 
The law of the Establishment Clause has been moving away from a regime of strict 
separationism and toward a regime of neutrality.203  The principles of Tilton and Nyquist have guided 
federal policy for the past twenty years or more.  There are reasons to believe, however, that the 
Supreme Court may no longer adhere to the full sweep of this exclusion of structures devoted to 
worship or religious instruction from government assistance.  Thus, the opinion is correct that although 
Tilton and Nyquist have not been overturned, they may no longer stand as good law. 204  The opinion, 
however, should have gone further to apply the now relevant Mitchell test to the historic preservation 
grants to determine their constitutionality. 205   
Because the plurality opinion in Mitchell garnered only four votes, the controlling opinion is 
the concurrence with the narrowest holding, here Justice O’Connor’s.206  Taking these two opinions 
together, it is clear that the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine has been overruled, no longer requiring 
                                                 
201 See infra Part IV. 
202 Note that this note does not analyze the free speech and free exercise arguments raised by the opinion.  The opinion 
raises these issues to demonstrate a broader doctrinal shift in Supreme Court treatment of religion across constitutional 
clauses.  As such, it is not directly relevant to a challenge under the Establishment Clause to historic preservation grants to 
religious institutions, and thus, is beyond the    
203 See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808, 835-36 (plurality opinion); id. at 837, 851 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223. 
204 See Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 6, at 16. 
205 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808, 835-36 (plurality opinion); id. at 837, 851 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
206 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”).   
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religious institutions to segregate their religious activities to receive aid,207 and has been replaced with 
a question of “neutrality plus” from O’Connor’s concurring opinion. 208  O’Connor’s opinion suggests 
that neutrality is a necessary and important consideration in judging Establishment Clause cases, but 
that factor may not be sufficient in and of itself.209  Instead, courts must examine whether actual 
diversion of aid occurs and whether the “particular facts of each case” reveal that the Establishment 
Clause has been violated.210  As such, just as Justice O’Connor did in her concurrence in Mitchell,211 
the Court in this case would apply the modified Lemon test from Agostini v. Felton considering and 
balancing each factor: (1) whether the government had a secular purpose; and (2) whether the aid has 
the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 212  Three “primary criteria” are used in the “effects test” 
inquiry: (1) whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination; (2) whether the aid program defines 
its recipients by reference to religion; and (3) whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement 
between government and religion. 213   
A.  Secular Purpose Test 
First, it is undisputed that the Save America’s Treasures Program has a secular purpose.214  The 
program is designed to preserve America’s historic resources without regard to their secular or 
sectarian characters.215  The grants are available, and have been available, to recipients of all sorts.216  
As such, the Program is in no way a vehicle for the advancement of religious purposes.   
                                                 
207 See, e.g. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223 (students attending religious schools eligible for federal remedial assistance); 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (Christian student organization eligible for student 
activity funds); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (publicly funded sign language interpreter could 
assist student in a Catholic school); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (blind student 
free to use public vocational assistance to attend bible college). 
208 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837, 851 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
209 Id. at 837. 
210 Id. at 839. 
211 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808, 844-45 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
212 Id. at 231. 
213 Id. at 234. 
214 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 845 (O’ Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that it is important to “ask whether the 
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion”) (internal quotations omitted). 
215 See generally Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant 
Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77. 
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B.  Effects Test 
Secondly, the grants do not have the effect of advancing religion.  In order to determine effect, 
the neutrality of the criteria used to assign the aid must first be evaluated.217  It seems clear that the 
criteria for determining grant eligibility are neutral on their face as none take religion into account in 
any way.218  The first criteria requires a showing of national significance, that the property has an 
“exceptional value or quality in illustrating or interpreting the intellectual and cultural heritage and the 
built environment of the United States,” that it possesses “a high degree of integrity,” that it is 
associated with events, persons, ideas, or ideals that are especially significant in American history, and 
that it is listed on the National Register or is eligible to be.219  Here, in fact, it is more difficult for a 
religious building to obtain this status, as they are “ordinarily” deemed ineligible for listing on the 
Register unless that religious property derives “primary significance from architectural or artistic 
distinction or historical importance.”220   
Grant applicants must also demonstrate that the historic property is “threatened” or 
“endangered,” or that it has an “urgent preservation and/or conservation need.”221  Additionally, the 
proposed project “must address the threat and must have educational, interpretive, or training value and 
a clear public benefit.”222  Finally, the project must be financially feasible.223  These criteria clearly do 
not consider religion. 
Notably, the analysis in the opinion goes beyond the dictates of Mitchell to apply a novel 
reasoning by evaluating the neutrality of the criteria as they may be applied.224  The opinion asks to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
216 Save America’s Treasures, Official Project Profiles, at http://www.saveamericastreasures.org/profiles.htm, supra  note 
78.   
217 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838-39 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
218 See generally Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant 
Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77. 
219 Id. 
220 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2004). 
221 See Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally Significant 
Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, supra  note 77. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 6, at 10-13. 
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what extent the criteria leave room for an administrator with discretion to favor religion when 
considering grant applications.225  “We believe that the degree to which officials administering public 
aid have discretion to favor (or disfavor) religious institutions – and, far more important, the manner in 
which they exercise that discretion – are relevant to the aid’s constitutionality.”226  The opinion’s 
analysis is logical in that even though criteria appear to be neutral, this appearance is insufficient 
where a biased administrator could exercise his discretion to favor religion in practice.  In the case of 
this program, the opinion is correct to conclude that the limited discretion allowed within the criteria 
does not leave room for favoritism.227  In addition, although not recognized by the opinion, the 
administrative oversight involved in the program would not allow a single administrator’s bias to be 
acted upon. 228   
Under the Mitchell plurality opinion, the Program’s secular purpose and its neutral criteria 
would practically dispose of this case.229  Under the analysis of Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer, 
however, the neutrality of the Program remains a critical factor in considering its constitutionality, but 
additional considerations must also weigh in favor of constitutionality. 230  Justice O’Connor noted that 
the Court has “never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because 
                                                 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 13. 
227 Id. at 12-13; See Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve Nationally 
Significant Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application Instructions, 
supra  note 77. 
228 After the Park Service completes its ranking of the applicants, a panel of experts with professional expertise in fields 
such as history, preservation, conservation, archeology rank applications and make funding recommendations to the 
Secretary of the Interior.  In order to insulate the panel members from external influence, the Department of the Interior 
does not disclose their identity to the public.  The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the President’s Committee 
on the Arts and the Humanities, will select applicants and forward those selections to the House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations for concurrence.  See Save America’s Treasures: FY 2003 Historic Preservation Fund, Grants to Preserve 
Nationally Significant Intellectual and Cultural Artifacts and Historic Structures and Sites, Guidelines and Application 
Instructions, supra  note 77. 
229 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829-32. 
230 Although she recognized that “neutrality is an important reason for upholding government-aid programs against 
Establishment Clause challenges,” she would not make neutrality, and neutrality alone, the one factor of “singular 
importance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to government school-aid programs.” Id. at 837, 
838; see id. at 838-39 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We have emphasized a program’s neutrality repeatedly 
in our decisions approving various forms of school aid.”) (citing cases). 
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of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid.”231  Instead, Justices O’Connor and 
Breyer would hold that “neutrality is important, but it is by no means the only ‘axiom in the history 
and precedent of the Establishment Clause.’”232  Instead, courts must examine whether actual diversion 
of aid occurs and whether the particular facts of each case reveal that the Establishment Clause has 
been violated.233  As such, the next considerations are of the “primary criteria” used to determine 
whether the grants program has the “effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”234 
 1.  Indoctrination 
Compelling arguments exist on both sides of the question of whether the aid appears to result in 
governmental indoctrination.  Agostini requires that the grant to a religious institution be based on 
secular, neutral criteria to avoid the appearance that government is endorsing religion or funding 
indoctrination. 235  Neutral criteria must also be considered with regard to the extent that the funding 
will have a constitutionally impermissible effect by actually supporting religious indoctrination. 236  
Justice O’Connor has specifically criticized past Supreme Court cases for “applying an irrebuttable 
presumption that secular instructional materials and equipment would be diverted to use for religious 
indoctrination.”237  Instead of focusing on this irrebuttable presumption that even the secular courses in 
a religious school are “inescapably” religious,238 Justice O’Connor would require those challenging a 
statute to “prove that the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes.”239  Thus, 
O’Connor requires a consideration of both whether there is the appearance that the government is 
                                                 
231 Id. at 839. 
232 Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846 (O’ Connor, J., concurring)); see also  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 
533 U.S. 98, (2001) (“We have held that a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of 
Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”) (internal quotations omitted).   
233 Id. 
234  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 234. 
235 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 33-35 (1997).   
236 Id.; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 845. 
237 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing and joining the plurality opinion in expressly overruling Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (invalidating a program sending public employees into parochial schools to provide 
auxiliary services to students); and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (invalidating state program allowing for field 
trips for private schools). 
238 Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250. 
239 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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endorsing religion, and also whether government funds are being diverted to actually support religious 
indoctrination.   
 a.  Appearance of Endorsement 
The Mitchell plurality suggested that neutral criteria are sufficient to establish that the 
government is not appearing to endorse religion: “If the religious, irreligious, and a-religious are all 
alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular 
recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government.”240  Because the concurring opinion 
did not disagree with this point, it appears that neutral criteria to disburse aid is sufficient to assure that 
such aid does not appear to be an endorsement of religion.  241  In this case, as has been established, the 
criteria used to evaluate applications are neutral and serve a secular purpose.242   
The opinion also suggests, although less than clearly, that there is less of a concern of the 
appearance of endorsement where historic preservation grants are distributed to a wide range of 
institutions to use strictly as opposed to those grants strictly limited to educational recipients.243  This 
distinction seems unnecessary because, in Mitchell, the plurality and the concurrence upheld aid that 
was directed to only educational institutions, and specifically to religious primary and secondary 
schools.244  Thus, the Supreme Court has not required that grant programs have a range of recipients 
that spans across many fields.   
 b.  Actual Diversion of Funds 
The opinion delineates the statutory and regulatory requirements that prevent Save America’s 
Treasures grants from being used to promote religion. 245  The opinion, however, does not indicate how 
this factor relates to the constitutionality of the grant program.  In fact, these limits on the stricter 
requirements for religious places to qualify for the National Register and thus be eligible for grants, 
                                                 
240 Id. at 809. 
241 Id. at 851 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
242 See infra text accompanying notes 217-228. 
243 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 6, at 8-10. 
244 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810. 
245 Memorandum from M. Edward Whelan III,  supra  note 6, at 13-14. 
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and the auditing and covenant requirements after the grant has been awarded, are relevant to the second 
prong of the Agostini test, whether the government aid is actually being used to support religion.246   
Justice O’Connor criticized the plurality in Mitchell for approving the “actual diversion of 
government aid to religious indoctrination.”247  She wrote that the Court has “long been concerned that 
secular government aid not be diverted to the advancement of religion.”248  Actual diversion concerned 
Justice O’Connor because if “religious indoctrination is supported by government assistance, the 
reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as government support for the 
advancement of religion.”249  Justice O’Connor’s concerns with governmental aid to houses of 
worship, therefore, would be lessened if these places did not actually use the aid for religious 
purposes.250   
In this case, properties that are owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes 
are eligible for Save America’s Treasures grants only if they “deriv[e] primary significance from 
architectural or artistic distinction or historical importance,”251 and “[g]rants may be made . . . for the 
preservation, stabilization, restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National 
Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, does not promote 
religion, and seeks to protect those qualities that are historically significant,”252  Thus, the Department 
of the Interior may provide grants for the preservation of religious structures only insofar as such 
preservation protects those structures’ historically significant components, and as such, grants are 
limited to secular uses and solely to protect those non-religious historical elements of otherwise 
religious buildings.   
                                                 
246 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-35 (1997).   
247 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
248 Id. at 840. 
249 Id. at 843. 
250 See id. at 843. 
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Yet, the Tilton case involved higher education, 253 and in Nyquist, the program for secondary 
schools was struck down. 254  By extension, could the Court find that religious indoctrination is even 
more likely to occur in a house of worship – that when the government finances the preservation of a 
house of worship in which religious indoctrination explicitly occurs, the government is effectively 
financing “religious activities” forbidden by Justice O’Connor’s controlling opinion in Mitchell?255  To 
answer this question, it seems that given the Court’s recent jurisprudence, these holdings in Tilton and 
Nyquist would not withstand further review.  Rather, it seems that the Court is willing to uphold 
government aid to an institution that engages in religious behavior and education, as long as the aid 
itself is not actually used for that purpose.256 
Finally, other aspects of the Program ensure that Save America’s Treasures grants are provided 
“only for the benefit of the public” and not used for religious purposes. 257  Grantees must agree to 
encumber their property with a fifty year covenant to keep open to the public all portions of 
rehabilitated structures that are not visible from the public way for twelve days a year,258 and to 
“repair, maintain, and administer the premises so as to preserve the historical integrity of the features, 
materials, appearance, workmanship, and setting that made the property eligible for the National 
Register of Historic Places.”259  To ensure compliance with these requirements, those receiving grants 
must keep detailed records and are subject to audit by the government to ensure that the grants are used 
only for designated purposes.260  Thus, as Mitchell held that the government need not “have a failsafe 
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mechanism capable of detecting any instance of diversion,”261 in this case, the safeguards against 
sectarian diversion are more than constitutionally sufficient.   
2.  Recipients Defined on Basis of Religion 
Agostini’s second criterion under the effects test, whether an aid program defines its recipients 
by reference to religion, 262 is largely left unanswered by the opinion. 263  The plurality in Mitchell 
explained that the second criterion is related to the first, as it considers the same facts as the neutrality 
inquiry, 264 but asks whether the criteria for allocating the aid creates a financial incentive to undertake 
religious indoctrination. 265  The plurality in Mitchell, and left unquestioned by the concurrence, holds 
that “[s]uch an incentive is not present where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria 
that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular 
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.”266   
The historic preservation context has a unique answer to the question of whether direct grants 
provide incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.  First, no incentive exists for a property to 
undertake religious activities because the grants are available on an equal basis to religious and secular 
properties.267  Secondly, in this case, no property is eligible for the grant unless it is at least fifty years 
old and meets the other criteria for national significance.268  As such, individual property owners have 
little to no actual control over whether their property is eligible for a grant from this Program.  
Therefore, because the grant criteria are neutral as to the activities in or uses of the historic properties, 
the program creates no incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.   
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3.  Excessive Entanglement 
The Court has explained that “[n]ot all entanglements, of course, have the effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion. 269  Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we have always 
tolerated some level of involvement between the two.  Entanglement must be ‘excessive’ before it runs 
afoul of the Establishment Clause.”270   As such, there is no basis to conclude that allowing active 
religious structures to receive aid would “excessively entangle” church and state, because there is no 
more governmental monitoring of grant recipients here than in other cases in which the Court has not 
questioned the provision of aid under the entanglement prong.  These programs have included the 
review of the materials used by an adolescent counseling program set up by the religious institutions, 
and monitoring of that program by periodic visits,271 annual audits conducted by the state, 272 and 
unannounced monthly visits by public supervisors.273  Here, where the grants are limited to use on the 
secular and historically significant portion of the religious properties, require maintenance for fifty 
years, and only potential auditing are certainly less onerous burdens on religious institutions than those 
that have already been deemed constitutionally acceptable.274   
4.  Outcome 
Under the modified Lemon test applied by the Agostini and Mitchell Courts, the historic 
preservation grants to religious buildings would be upheld under the Establishment Clause.  Yet, 
although these federal grants may be provided to religious buildings, it seems clear that those funds 
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cannot be used to rehabilitate any element of those buildings.  Rather, both the relevant regulations 275 
and the Establishment Clause276 require that these grants be limited to the support of only secular 
elements of the historic religious buildings.  If the federal government funded the restoration of some 
plainly religious element of a building that serves no purpose other than for religious conduct or 
religious ornamentation, such as a crucifix or perhaps an altar, this would violate the Mitchell test as 
having the effect of advancing religion277 as the grants appear to endorse religion because they actually 
support religious indoctrination. 278  In addition, under Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Mitchell, the 
grants are impermissible because the funds are actually diverted to support religious indoctrination. 279   
A closer question, in contrast, is whether the use of government funds to restore something less 
obviously religious, such as stained glass windows, would have the effect of advancing religion. 280  
Such windows often depict religious imagery, yet, they are also visible from the outside of the building 
and may lend to the building’s historic character.  An argument can be made that the funding is 
acceptable if the windows are historically significant, are not used in a religious service beyond simply 
allowing light into the building, and the funding is provided to a broad range of recip ients not defined 
by religion.  In contrast, an argument can be made that the stained glass windows that depict religious 
imagery cannot be divorced from that character, and therefore, it is impermissible for the federal 
government to subsidize this religious message.  Because the issue of providing federal funding for this 
type of religious imagery is such a close question and may be interpreted differently by different 
courts, it may be prudent to avoid this issue by declining to fund such projects.   
                                                 
275 “Grants may be made . . . for the preservation, stabilization, restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in 
the National Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, does not promote religion, and 
seeks to protect those qualities that are historically significant.”  16 U.S.C. § 470a(e)(4) (emphasis added). 
276 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
277 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809. 
278 Id. 
279 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
280 See Lupu & Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 
supra note 15, at 1174.  The authors here discuss the distinction between the funding of the interior and the exterior of 
religious buildings and determine that because the state could not require a religious institution to retain stained glass 
windows, (not a foregone conclusion), the government cannot fund the restoration of those windows either.   
41 
Another suggestion may be made that the beneficiaries of federal grants from the Save 
America’s Treasures program should be required to provide notice to the public of the nature of the 
building’s national, historic significance.  This notice would further the principle that Save America’s 
Treasures grants are provided “only for the benefit of the public”281 by ensuring that the public, in fact, 
is aware of the import of the building to appreciate it as such.  In addition, this notice would further 
ensure that the funding does not have the effect of advancing religion, because it would more clearly 
demonstrate to Justice O’Connor’s “reasonable observer” that “religious indoctrination is [not being] 
supported by government assistance.”282  Rather, the government assistance is solely directed to 
preserving the secular elements of an important, historic, and only coincidentally religious building.  
This notice could be in the form of signage, tours, or other media, and should be readily available to 
those who visit dur ing the days the building must be open to the public.   
It is important to note, finally, that in Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court, in no uncertain 
terms, instructed that “we do not hold that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by 
implication, overruled an earlier precedent.”283  The Court went on to “reaffirm that if a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”284  Despite the apparent movement in the doctrine of 
the Establishment Clause, the rule of Tilton, Hunt  and Nyquist, that prohibits government aid to 
construct, maintain or repair pervasively sectarian institutions, has never been repudiated or directly 
questioned by a majority of the Supreme Court.  If the principles underlying these cases have been 
explicitly overruled, however, it is fair to assume that the Supreme Court may take the opportunity to 
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dispense with this case law that is in tension with its more recent decisions in Agostini and Mitchell.  
Yet, the votes of the Justices were nearly unanimous in the Tilton-Hunt-Nyquist jurisprudence.285  In 
fact, Justice O’Connor cites Tilton with apparent approval in her concurrence in Mitchell.286  As such, 
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in flux and perhaps it is not fair or wise to attempt to discern 
its future. 
B.  Principle of Non-Discrimination in General Governmental Services 
Since its first modern Establishment Clause decision in Everson v. Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that religious institutions are entitled to receive “general government 
services” made available on the basis of neutral criteria.287  Everson held that the Establishment Clause 
does not prevent the government from providing generally available busing services to students 
attending religious schools.288  The Court explained that even if the neutral provision of busing 
services increased the likelihood that some parents would send their children to religious schools, the 
same could be said with respect to other general government benefits such as “ordinary police and fire 
protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways, and sidewalks.”289  The Court concluded 
that “the First Amendment . . . requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.  State power is no more 
to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.”290   
This principle has been reaffirmed many times and most recently by the dissent in Mitchell: 
“We do not regard the postal system as aiding religion, even though parochial schools get mail.”291  In 
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Board of Education  v. Allen, the Court also permitted the government to provide secular textbooks 
loaned by the State on equal terms to students attending both public and church-related elementary 
schools.292  Because it had not been shown in this case that the secular textbooks would be used for 
anything but secular purposes, the Court concluded that, as in Everson, the State was merely 
“extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens.”293  Thus, Everson and Allen hold that sometimes 
the State may act in a way that has the incidental effect of facilitating religious activity: 
 The Court has not been blind to the fact that in aiding a religious institution to perform 
a secular task, the State frees the institution’s resources to be put to sectarian ends.  If 
this were impermissible, however, a church could not be protected by the police and fire 
departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair. The Court never has held that 
religious activities must be discriminated against in this way. 294  
 
The Court has “consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a 
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment 
Clause challenge.”295  As Justice Brennan expressed the point in Texas Monthly: “Insofar as [a] 
subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in 
pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not 
deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment 
Clause.”296  For example, in Walz v. Tax Commission,297 the Court rejected an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a property tax exemption made available not only to churches, but to other nonprofit 
institutions, such as “hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic 
groups.”298  In upholding the tax exemption, the Court relied in part upon its breadth: the exemption 
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did “not single[] out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such,” but rather was 
available to “a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations.”299  
The opinion is correct to argue that the Save America’s Treasures program is ana logous to aid 
that qualifies as “general government services” approved by the Court in Everson.  Although the 
historic preservation grants program is not as universal as fire fighting, for example, the broad range of 
beneficiaries is extensive enough to satisfy existing Supreme Court precedent.  The Save America’s 
Treasures program includes a broad range of beneficiary institutions, “including not only private non-
profit groups, but state and local governmental units, Indian tribes, and numerous federal agencies, 
each of which may seek funding to preserve any and all kinds of historic structures.”300   As such, just 
as the wide-ranging group of beneficiaries was sufficient to sustain the inclusion of religious 
institutions for the tax benefit in Walz, the breadth of eligibility for the Save America’s Treasures 
Program weighs heavily in favor of its constitutionality as well.301  In contrast to the education-specific 
aid in Nyquist, Hunt, and Tilton, the grants under this program are awarded to beneficiaries in a vast 
number of fields.  Thus, although the grants are not as widely distributed as mail or fire fighting 
service, they are provided to many beneficiaries for one common goal, the preservation of buildings 
that played an important role in our nation’s history.302 
CONCLUSION 
 The Save America’s Treasures program has helped protect more than 700 of the country’s 
defining buildings, sites, and documents.303  Historic religious buildings are among those places that 
represent our country’s cultural heritage and stand as important links to our past as a nation.  Under the 
recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Mitchell v. Helms, the 
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Supreme Court would likely uphold the grant to the Old North Church, or another religious building.304  
The regulations controlling the use of grant funds by religious institutions prohibit those funds from 
being used to promote religion, and may only be used to preserve historically significant features.  As 
such, the grant program has a secular purpose, and does not have the effect of advancing religion.  In 
addition, the grant program may be sustained under the principle that religious institutions may not be 
discriminated against in the distribution of general governmental services provided on the basis of 
neutral criteria.305  Thus, if challenged, the Supreme Court should find that historic preservation grants 
to religious institutions distributed on the basis of neutral criteria do not endorse religion.  Rather, such 
grants demonstrate that the government is not hostile to religion, and will not discriminate against it.  
This should especially be true in the context of the preservation of buildings that played an important 
role in our nation’s history and that, given their charitable status, are most in need of assistance. 
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